Two days ago, I said I would be talking about the thinking subject in Proust as well as Nietzsche when writing about what thought is. What was going through my head at the time, were passages in the Bersani book on Proust and Klossowski on Proust that seemed to jump out and touch each other, where certain details could have been in either book, though a somewhat different end was in sight in each case. I mentioned - and Bersani mentioned - that Sartre hated Proust, and yet, Proust like Sartre doesn't allow any direct access to a thinking subject. In order to describe oneself, have any idea at all about oneself, one has to make use of the external world. A self is projected onto a face in the mirror, you deduce things about the self from the objects it is attracted to or repulsed by and the way it reacts to the outside world. When you try to find something prior to or independent of the outside world, you come up blank. Of course you are familiar with the famous statement in Nietzsche that the doer is just a fiction added on to the deed. Proust doesn't go so far... both Nietzsche and Proust talk about a lack of stability in the self. Proust, in talking about love notes that in the future we will be indifferent to the woman who means everything to us now, that rather than caring only about what she is doing and who she is with, even the most insignificant fact will seem more interesting than who she's with, and this is because we will be a different person. We are countless people throughout our lives... but he contradicts himself on this point more than Nietzsche does (though, Nietzsche also talks about his past self in a way that suggests continuity as well as insisting on a complete lack of continuity). While Sartre and Nietzsche are both extremely anti-Socratc and suspicious of any sort of essence or essentializing of the self, I've explained to you countless times that Proust IS socratic, and moments of pure time allow a certain access to the pure self, as does the creative activity of art. When I spoke of the Compagnon book on Proust the conflict between dissolution and unity came up a few times... oddly, that's also coming up in the Bersani books and in Klossowski on Nietzsche. I suspect that a large theme for me in coming entries (though not this one) will be the role of style in the determination and formation of self.
I should state that it disturbs me how often I can't make sense of something I'm reading or I suspect that I'm missing something important. This periodically makes me question whether I ought to throw in the towel and find another line of work (last night I was also in cold sweats about being in my mid-thirties and still basically a teenager with no solid accomplishments behind me. (It should give me a little boost that I've been getting s bit of fan mail for the article I just published, but it's just a short article and I didn't put much into it. It doesn't make me feel better.) All this is neither here nor there - it's brought up by the fact that reading Bersani's book "Baudelaire and Freud", I'm painfully aware that I should have clearer knowledge of all the psychoanalytic backdrop. I'm not bothered so much by not being up on figures like Pontalis (though he's the one who published Wolfson), Laplanche and Melanie Klein, but with certain basic things - I have to admit that I couldn't explain Lacan's shift from the imaginary to the symbolic, which is important for Bersani's analysis, and, equally important, I have a pretty weak grasp of the death drive in Freud.
Anyway, before attempting to make sense of what Bersani does with Baudelaire and general reflections on using psychoanalysis to approach literature (which I think people thankfully don't do so much any more), a word or two on Baudelaire himself (who Sartre also hated, though he wrote a book on him - Sartre generally had no use for poetry). Baudelaire was a kind of sick bastard. The poem 'A celle qui est trop gai' ends with the poet envisioning opening a new hole in the overly light-hearted woman's thigh, fucking that hole and releasing his 'venom' into it, at which point he can address her as 'sister'. In all fairness, this probably does cry out for a psychoanalysts attention. The prose poem 'assomons les pauvres' (let's beat up the poor), is kind of great - the narrator has been cloistered in his room reading books of basically political science and sociological commentary, explaining how to fix the world. He goes out and a beggar asks him for money - he turns and starts beating the beggar, and won't stop until the beggar is forced to fight back. At the end, he tells the beggar "you have shown you are my equal", splits his money with him 50-50 and asks the beggar to go out and spread his lesson - imagining that once all the beggars are driven to fight back and no longer accept their position society will be transformed. What Bersani does with this last piece, and with Baudelaire's later writings in general doesn't seem that interesting to me. He interprets the prose poem as an expression of narcissism... the beggar is meant to mimic the narrator, and drive others to mimc him in turn - ideally ad infinitum. This is in a sense the ultimate projection of the self onto the world, an attempt at infinite expansion and conquest, where "you are my equal" hides a second, "you are my reflection". The one topic that is more interesting in Baudelaire's later works is the attempt at impersonality - the loss of affect on the part of the speaker, the projection of the self onto the world outside, so that desire is always ascribes to others... it's just unfortunate that this is discussed in relation to developmental phases and psychosis/schizophrenia, etc. It's odd, because in other books, and even at the beginning of this one, Bersani doesn't fall into that sort of silliness - rather than trying to use literature as demonstration of psychoanalytic theories, he tries to understand what is unique and interesting in a work, and uses psychoanalysis, sparingly, as a prop to help elucidate a very particular structure. The beginning of his Baudelaire book focuses on the mobility of desire - desire as something that resists stasis. The influence of Deleuze keeps coming up in his discussion of the nature of desire. Desire is not initially a desire for something - it is free floating and given content. The self is inherently unstable, free-floating desire, and when the poet writes about sexual impulses, he doesn't fixate on one thing, one detail - the object of his interest keeps getting fragmented and transformed - the desire follows metaphor. It floats between the poet and the woman, is shared by them both and carries them both in all directions (Again, the constant mobility of desire and the inability of the will to ever attain stasis comes up a lot in Klossowski's discussion of Nietzsche - which I'll write about tomorrow). Bersani writes that ironically, when Baudelaire is writing about seual desire, there is no straightforward sexual representation - straightforward sexual representations come in poems like 'A celle qui est trop gai', which are about violence and death - or rather stasis as the end of desire. A search for unity is equivalent to a search for immobility, and is always included in desire, which is the opposite, driving toward dissipation. Death/ stasis/ unity, is given as an orgasmic finish inseparable from all desire, and the death drive can not be separated from the pleasure principle.
I can't be blamed for all of this psychoanalytic mumbo-jumbo. Surprisingly I recognize lots of parallels and dynamics that tie it to texts I can take more seriously... but you remember the statement in Proust about theory in literature cheapening it - well most of this does seem like an excessive application of theory to literature where both theory and literature seem to me a bit degraded - even if Bersani is bright and can be convincing in passages (again, his other two books, which didn't have Freud in the title, were less heavy-handed, and to me more enlightening).
Showing posts with label Bersani. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bersani. Show all posts
Monday, August 16, 2010
Sunday, August 15, 2010
Bersani on Proust
I've read three books by Leo Bersani this summer - one one Mallarmé (the Death of Stephane Mallarmé was a particularly short book that I could only get for a week or so before it had to be returned. It was about Mallarmé's 'becoming impersonal', the moment in his career when he ceased to be a person and became what he called an aptitude the universe had for observing itself... I ought to go look up the quote. It will come up again elsewhere, but for the most part I can't really remember Bersani's argument, and I'm not going to try to write about the book that I almost might as well have not read for all I've retained), one on Baudelaire (which I'll try writing about tomorrow), and one on Proust, which I should have a decent chance of describing here. Bersani comes out of a moment before the structuralists were 'in', when two dominant influences in literary criticism were psychoanalysis, which continued to be Bersani's main influence, and Sartrean existential critique, which was a secondary but still important presence for Bersani - particularly in his book on Proust. Sartre is, of course, as anti-psychoanalysis as you can get - in his autobiography he stresses that he never had a super-ego (he grew up without a father), and he's always against discussing 'inner lives', convinced that a person IS their words and actions. Sartre, as Bersani points out, hated Proust.
There is a line the narrator drops in la recherche, which states roughly that a novel with theory in it is like an article from which the price tag has not been removed. This insistence that displaying the theory underlying the creation of a novel is cheap and unworthy is puzzling in Proust, considering how much is in la recherche that is hard to understand as anything other than theory underlying the novels construction. Bersani writes "The narrator's theorizing about his own work often seems inadequate to describe what he has done; his intellectual claims seem both pretentious and thin [...] in comparison to passages written from deeper levels of his mind than the one at which the would-be metaphysician operates". Talk of a 'deeper level of mind', is of course kind of dubious because it is so vague, and impossible to demonstrate (this sort of statement isn't really typical of Bersani), but the tension between theory and practice in the writing of the novel is related to a number of other tensions that he discusses which do point to some of what makes Proust 's work what it is. The narrator, and the hero in la recherche (the same person decades apart and distinct in voice and even interests), are both almost obsessive about finding general rules to explain the world and people's behavior. There clearly are dynamics driving almost everything in the book - the most important and well-known rule underlying human behavior in Proust is that people are attracted to and place value on what resists them, which is why love is more or less equated with jealousy. When everyone is driven by the same set of principals, when a small number of simple rules is altered and varied to make politics and war, social success and love all resemble each other, all be useful to make one another comprehensible, it would be normal to worry that a book would end up deadened by a universal sameness, that at some point you would get the point and reading onward would be a monotonous experience. Either in this book or in the Baudelaire book (I can't remember), Bersani says the same thing Proust always does about Balzac, but in an even more pointed fashion: when Balzac presents a character, he tells you everything you really need to know about who the character is and what drives him. From that first description, you have the necessary information to determine everything he'll do in the rest of the book and how he would react to any given situation - If Proust's general laws were absolute and comprehensive, it might not be one character, but all characters and the entire world whose actions and developments could be predicted without having to be recounted. This might seem even more of a danger when you take into consideration another central aspect of how the narrator interacts with the world. The only things or people that interest the narrator are those that he can project some aspect of himself or his imagination onto. Things and people interest him because he has romantic images of how they'll be, and because they never conform to those images, they always disappoint. Things and people that are truly alien can not be known - the very strong desire for the other is generally a desire to assimilate and control the other, the joy of reducing the strange to the familiar (and thus comprehensible)... right now what I'm saying is straying a bit from exactly how Proust describes things, but the idea is there. So, as Bersani points out, all other characters risk being no more than a projection of the self at the center of the book. What we know of them is a mixture between what he projects on to them, and what he can identify with in them. Extending this, keeping basically with the sense of what Bersani says but veering a bit further off what Proust explicitly says... thinking of Descartes and Berkley... who was it that said Berkeley stated something that may logically hold up but which no sane person could honestly believe (I'm not thinking about Johnson)? Basically the idea that, yes, our knowledge of the external world may not be objective, we can never know that the outside world perfectly conforms to what we imagine it to be, but whether it can be fully known or not, we recognize that out perceptions are necessarily of an outside world that objectively exists - we are not making it up, even if we project certain things onto it or slightly distort aspects of it. The outside world resists us and forces itself upon us - that force and that resistance changes us and changes what we project and how we perceive. Bersani remarks that in Proust, it is amazing that a work that is so dominated by certain general laws, where the only love is jealous love, etc. should end up having such a large number of strongly differentiated characters, who feel real, who cohere, and resist what the main character thinks or says about them. He compares the number and clarity of characters to Tolstoy, and takes as an image from the early chapters of la recherche, the 'magic lantern' the hero has as a small child - a sort of projector that casts images from stories onto the walls of his room, where you can continue to see the doorknob at the same time as you see the light image of Golo that is cast over it. The projections of the main character never seem to be cast out into the void, the book does not give the impression of a single psyche, but of a psyche wrestling with a concrete world that resists him and remains larger and more complex than what he can ever fully grasp. If there is theorizing throughout the book, the theories are the main character trying to make sense of his experiences, but the experiences are not created out of those theories, and they don't ever fully conform to the theories. The book does not read as a controlled experiment.
Proust was obsessed with John Ruskin for a very long time, and I remember a passage in Ruskin... I imagine it was about the Pre-Raphaelites, in which he talks about how in a painting with symbolic imagery, one might, for instance, paint the birth of Christ taking place in the ruins of an old temple. The temple symbolizing Judaism which had fallen into disrepair and which would be supplanted by Christ's coming. In a painting like this, he said, the temple and any other symbolic elements should be painted absolutely naturally and convincingly, so that someone unaware of the significance of those elements would simply accept it as a natural scene. Bersani also talks about the use of simile over in metaphor - two objects brought together in such a way that each maintains their original character...
But I'm trailing off here. Presenting an entire book in a little blurb like this is always an act of violence, but I suppose the couple of central ideas I'm taking away from the thing are here... I'm sure that others will be reactivated in the next Proust book I read. I think the biggest thing missing is the importance and meaning of style, which I can try to address some when I talk about Deleuze on Proust.
There is a line the narrator drops in la recherche, which states roughly that a novel with theory in it is like an article from which the price tag has not been removed. This insistence that displaying the theory underlying the creation of a novel is cheap and unworthy is puzzling in Proust, considering how much is in la recherche that is hard to understand as anything other than theory underlying the novels construction. Bersani writes "The narrator's theorizing about his own work often seems inadequate to describe what he has done; his intellectual claims seem both pretentious and thin [...] in comparison to passages written from deeper levels of his mind than the one at which the would-be metaphysician operates". Talk of a 'deeper level of mind', is of course kind of dubious because it is so vague, and impossible to demonstrate (this sort of statement isn't really typical of Bersani), but the tension between theory and practice in the writing of the novel is related to a number of other tensions that he discusses which do point to some of what makes Proust 's work what it is. The narrator, and the hero in la recherche (the same person decades apart and distinct in voice and even interests), are both almost obsessive about finding general rules to explain the world and people's behavior. There clearly are dynamics driving almost everything in the book - the most important and well-known rule underlying human behavior in Proust is that people are attracted to and place value on what resists them, which is why love is more or less equated with jealousy. When everyone is driven by the same set of principals, when a small number of simple rules is altered and varied to make politics and war, social success and love all resemble each other, all be useful to make one another comprehensible, it would be normal to worry that a book would end up deadened by a universal sameness, that at some point you would get the point and reading onward would be a monotonous experience. Either in this book or in the Baudelaire book (I can't remember), Bersani says the same thing Proust always does about Balzac, but in an even more pointed fashion: when Balzac presents a character, he tells you everything you really need to know about who the character is and what drives him. From that first description, you have the necessary information to determine everything he'll do in the rest of the book and how he would react to any given situation - If Proust's general laws were absolute and comprehensive, it might not be one character, but all characters and the entire world whose actions and developments could be predicted without having to be recounted. This might seem even more of a danger when you take into consideration another central aspect of how the narrator interacts with the world. The only things or people that interest the narrator are those that he can project some aspect of himself or his imagination onto. Things and people interest him because he has romantic images of how they'll be, and because they never conform to those images, they always disappoint. Things and people that are truly alien can not be known - the very strong desire for the other is generally a desire to assimilate and control the other, the joy of reducing the strange to the familiar (and thus comprehensible)... right now what I'm saying is straying a bit from exactly how Proust describes things, but the idea is there. So, as Bersani points out, all other characters risk being no more than a projection of the self at the center of the book. What we know of them is a mixture between what he projects on to them, and what he can identify with in them. Extending this, keeping basically with the sense of what Bersani says but veering a bit further off what Proust explicitly says... thinking of Descartes and Berkley... who was it that said Berkeley stated something that may logically hold up but which no sane person could honestly believe (I'm not thinking about Johnson)? Basically the idea that, yes, our knowledge of the external world may not be objective, we can never know that the outside world perfectly conforms to what we imagine it to be, but whether it can be fully known or not, we recognize that out perceptions are necessarily of an outside world that objectively exists - we are not making it up, even if we project certain things onto it or slightly distort aspects of it. The outside world resists us and forces itself upon us - that force and that resistance changes us and changes what we project and how we perceive. Bersani remarks that in Proust, it is amazing that a work that is so dominated by certain general laws, where the only love is jealous love, etc. should end up having such a large number of strongly differentiated characters, who feel real, who cohere, and resist what the main character thinks or says about them. He compares the number and clarity of characters to Tolstoy, and takes as an image from the early chapters of la recherche, the 'magic lantern' the hero has as a small child - a sort of projector that casts images from stories onto the walls of his room, where you can continue to see the doorknob at the same time as you see the light image of Golo that is cast over it. The projections of the main character never seem to be cast out into the void, the book does not give the impression of a single psyche, but of a psyche wrestling with a concrete world that resists him and remains larger and more complex than what he can ever fully grasp. If there is theorizing throughout the book, the theories are the main character trying to make sense of his experiences, but the experiences are not created out of those theories, and they don't ever fully conform to the theories. The book does not read as a controlled experiment.
Proust was obsessed with John Ruskin for a very long time, and I remember a passage in Ruskin... I imagine it was about the Pre-Raphaelites, in which he talks about how in a painting with symbolic imagery, one might, for instance, paint the birth of Christ taking place in the ruins of an old temple. The temple symbolizing Judaism which had fallen into disrepair and which would be supplanted by Christ's coming. In a painting like this, he said, the temple and any other symbolic elements should be painted absolutely naturally and convincingly, so that someone unaware of the significance of those elements would simply accept it as a natural scene. Bersani also talks about the use of simile over in metaphor - two objects brought together in such a way that each maintains their original character...
But I'm trailing off here. Presenting an entire book in a little blurb like this is always an act of violence, but I suppose the couple of central ideas I'm taking away from the thing are here... I'm sure that others will be reactivated in the next Proust book I read. I think the biggest thing missing is the importance and meaning of style, which I can try to address some when I talk about Deleuze on Proust.
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